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LOVE AND HISTORY
Christopher Grau
abstract: In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the historicity of
love requires an appreciation of the irreplaceability of the beloved. I do this through
a consideration of ideas that were first put forward by Robert Kraut in “Love De Re”
(1986). I also evaluate Amelie Rorty’s criticisms of Kraut’s thesis in “The Historicity
of Psychological Attitudes: Love is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration
Finds” (1986). I argue that Rorty fundamentally misunderstands Kraut’s Kripkean
analogy, and I go on to criticize her claim that concern over the proper object of love
should be best understood as a concern over constancy. This leads me to an elabo-
ration of the distinct senses in which love can be seen as historical. I end with a further
defense of the irreplaceability of the beloved and a discussion of the relevance of
recent debates over the importance of personal identity for an adequate account of
the historical dimension of love.sjp_30 246..271
1. INTRODUCTION
In this essay I explore the different ways in which love involves a historical
dimension, and I argue that the proper way to capture the relevant historicity
of love includes an appreciation of the irreplaceability of the beloved. I do this
in part by offering an elaboration and a defense of some ideas that were
originally put forward by Robert Kraut in “Love De Re” (1986). I think
Kraut’s paper has been unjustly neglected in the subsequent literature
on love and attachment, and I think this neglect may be due in part to the
rather uncharitable treatment it received when it was discussed in a (now
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more famous) paper by Amelie Rorty entitled “The Historicity of Psycho-
logical Attitudes: Love is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration
Finds” (1986). While Rorty’s paper has plenty of independently valuable
insights about the nature of love, I argue that she basically misses Kraut’s
point and, thus, misses out on his helpful contribution to the topic. I also
consider a treatment of these issues by Hugh LaFollette in which, I believe, he
makes mistakes similar to Rorty’s. This will lead us to a clearer understanding
of the distinct senses in which love can be seen as historical and to a better
appreciation of both the strengths and weaknesses of the Kripkean analogy
Kraut has offered.1 I conclude with a further defense of the irreplaceability
and historicity of the beloved, one that situates these issues in relation to
philosophical debates concerning personal identity.
2. KRAUT’S ANALOGY
In his essay “Love De Re,” Robert Kraut considers the phenomenon of loving
individual persons in an interesting and unexpected way: he draws a striking
analogy between the referential behavior of linguistic terms and the attach-
ment of a lover to the beloved. As several contemporary philosophers have
noted, when we love an individual as an individual, we do not simply love the
person’s characteristics. Probably the most influential discussion of this issue
comes from Nozick.
Apparently, love is an interesting instance of another relationship that is historical,
in that (like justice) it depends upon what actually occurred. An adult may come to
love another because of the other’s characteristics; but it is the other person, and not
the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the
same characteristics, even to one who “scores” higher for these characteristics. And
the love endures through changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it. One loves
the particular person one actually encountered. Why love is historical, attaching to
persons in this way and not to characteristics, is an interesting and puzzling question.
(1974, 167–68)
Our love seems crucially to involve a historic tie to the beloved, one that can
survive a change in properties and is not necessarily proportional to any such
change. The parallel here is with the way in which proper names refer to
persons: the phenomenon of “rigid designation” made famous by Kripke
1 I should note that my defense here is limited to Kraut’s discussion of an analogy between
love and the reference of proper names as well as the notion of irreplaceability at play in each.
I share Deborah Brown’s (1997, 53–56) skepticism regarding whether Kraut’s functionalist
theory of the emotions provides an adequate framework for appreciating his insights regarding
reference and replacement.
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involves the idea that a proper name “rigidly” attaches to an object in such a
way that its reference does not switch or transfer to even an exactly similar
object. Kraut explains the analogy:
The kind of “historical tie” of which Nozick speaks is precisely the kind of tie that
holds between a proper name and its semantic referent (at least, according to several
popular accounts of proper names). Once a name n comes to denote object o (and
this might come about by virtue of o’s having certain general characteristics), the
name comes to be hooked up with o in a way that does not warrant the applicability
(“transferability”) of n to some distinct though relevantly similar object o*. This is
what rigid designation is all about. So we might say: a proper name is committed to
its bearer, in much the way that a lover is historically committed to the object of his
love.2
The dominant theory for the reference of proper names (pre-Kripke) was
what is known as a descriptivist theory. According to this theory, what secures
the reference of a proper name is the speaker’s grasp of a description that
uniquely picks out the object to which the name refers.3 In other words, I can
successfully refer to John Waters because I recognize him under the descrip-
tion “the film director who lives in Baltimore and directed Pink Flamingos,”
and this description does indeed uniquely pick him out: there is only one such
person, and that person is in fact John Waters. The apparently commonsense
thought is that something like this must be going on in order for names to
succeed in singular reference.
While this approach seems to work for many proper names, Kripke
pointed out that there are many others for which it does not. His insight
was that reference has a crucial historical or causal dimension. His so-called
causal theory of reference was inspired in part by his realization that
we “often use a name on the basis of considerable misinformation.”4 While
descriptivism claimed that reference presupposed some set of uniquely
referring descriptive statements, we can think of many everyday cases
where we have nothing close to the kind of knowledge required by such a
condition. All I might know about Lewis “Scooter” Libby is that he is
a dishonest politician, yet this is certainly not a unique description.
Similarly, my only “knowledge” of Chubby Checker might be that he
wrote “The Twist,” but this is actually false. Yet in both these cases
we would still want to claim that I successfully referred to the person in
2 Kraut 1986, 424. Compare with Harry Frankfurt (2006, 40): “The lover’s concern is
rigidly focused in that there can be no equivalent substitute for its object, which he loves in its
sheer particularity and not as an exemplar of some general type.”
3 The locus classicus of which can be found in Searle 1958.
4 Kripke 1980, 84. Kripke himself explicitly denied proposing a “theory” and instead
referred to a “picture.” For more on this distinction see Gutting 2009, 40.
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question.5 Kripke effectively demonstrated that a proper name refers to a
person through the tracing of a particular historical path and is not based
on a particular cluster of descriptions that may or may not apply to the
person in question.
The analogy with love should be clear at this point: just as the reference
of a proper name is historical (depending on a past causal history) and does
not refer to the person named in virtue of a description of his characteris-
tics, one’s love for another often has a historical (backward-looking) dimen-
sion and does not attach to a collection of properties but, instead, to a
singular person with a particular origin and causal history.6 This analogy
can be pushed even further: while descriptivism fails as an account of the
reference of many proper names, it is plausible to view certain general terms
as referring by virtue of descriptive content.7 The term ‘stapler’, for
example, arguably refers to any object that matches the proper description
of a stapler. Some general terms are accordingly nonhistorical in this
respect (Kraut 1986, 425). Similarly, when the focus of my love is a prop-
erty or a collection of properties rather than an individual person, presumably
my love will (or at least should) extend to whatever person or thing has
those properties.
One way, then, to determine the focus of one’s love is to consider whether
a different person who had the same properties would evoke the same atti-
tudes as the beloved. If so, then this is evidence toward the conclusion that
what one really loves is not the person as a singular individual but some
5 I am ignoring subtleties here, such as the fact that descriptivist theories have been revised
(by philosophers such as Searle) in order to allow an individual to rely parasitically on the
linguistic community’s knowledge of descriptions of the person being named. However, similar
(though more complicated) counterexamples can be constructed that raise similar problems for
such accounts.
6 Though not explicitly discussing reference or Kripke’s views, and perhaps unaware of
Kraut’s discussion, David Cockburn (1990, 152) offers a nice mocking example of a love
relationship that parallels the earlier Chubby Checker “failure” of reference: “What I think
would be absurd is the suggestion that my thought about my child is of a form such that
empirical discoveries could bear on it in the way suggested. For example, if I do not know my
child well it is possible that another should fit any description that I can give of the object of my
concern better than does my child. Perhaps, then, my distress over the sufferings of the boy who
lives in the same house as me is invariably misplaced!”
7 Kraut speaks as though no general terms have a rigid or historical dimension (e.g.,
“ ‘nonhistoricity’ is an earmark of general terms rather than proper names” [1986, 425]), but
Kripke seeks to extend his account of rigid designation to cover natural kinds and certain other
general terms, including terms for natural phenomena like ‘heat’, ‘light’, and ‘sound’. It is
unclear exactly what Kraut would say about this attempt: perhaps he is just reserving the
expression ‘general term’ for whatever terms do function along descriptivist lines, and he would
consider natural kinds and the like to be “names.” Whatever he might say, even Kripke can
agree that some terms (such as certain artifact terms) presumably refer along something like
descriptivist lines.
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aspects or properties of the person. Analogously, one way to determine
whether a word is being used rigidly as a proper name or, instead, more like
a general term (which functions along descriptivist lines) is to see if the user is
committed to applying it to any object that meets a certain descriptive
content, or if it is applied only to a particular historical object (or set of
objects). Kraut sums up his discussion of the analogy between love and proper
names as follows:
It is usually agreed that Lisa’s history and origin are essential to her. If so, a name
that uniquely refers to Lisa is not properly applicable to any possible object with a
history and origin different from Lisa’s. And, analogously, a love that is genuinely
directed toward Lisa does not get directed toward any object with a history and
origin different from hers. It is that that confers upon love the property of being
directed toward Lisa. And it is that that makes love, at least love of individual
persons, historical. (1986, 427)
In the end, the analogy between the bonds of love and a theory of reference
is perhaps not so surprising after all. When we use proper names to refer, we
are attempting to pick out concrete individuals, and when we love someone
as a particular person, our attachment is also to a concrete individual, that is,
the beloved.
3. THE IRREPLACEABILITY OF PERSONS
Kraut ends his essay by considering the relevance of this analogy to a proper
analysis of love, and he concludes that the analogy helps to show that “irre-
placeability or nonsubstitutivity” is the key notion to consider; he argues that
counterfactuals involving replaceability help to show us the intentional focus
of love and help us to determine whether a given love is genuinely historical
(and rigid) or not (1986, 427). As Kraut puts it:
The notion of a historical attitude is characterized in terms of a kind of bonding,
whether to an inanimate object or to a person. Bonding is in turn, a matter of
replaceability; and this latter notion involves counterfactuals about substitutes—
about whether a certain item could take the place of the original. . . . There is thus an
intimate tie between historicity, construed in terms of counterfactuals about replace-
ability, and the intentional focus of emotional attitudes. (1986, 428)
He does not go on to sketch out this account in much detail, but his general
analogy is helpful, and his drawing an explicit connection between this
“rigid,” historical dimension of love and irreplaceability helps us to better
understand the logic of the concepts involved. Consider the theoretical pos-
sibility of a swap between a loved one and a qualitatively exact duplicate:
one’s response to such a case helps show whether one’s bond is directed at a
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particular individual or not. Kraut and I both want to defend a vision of love
in which resistance to such substitution can be legitimate.8 There are others,
such as Derek Parfit, who disagree. Parfit, who in Reasons and Persons (1984)
notoriously denied “the importance of identity” and with it the reasonable-
ness of nonderivative self-concern, also denied that we have legitimate
grounds for preferring the original loved ones over exact duplicates. Consid-
ering the fictional case of a woman named Mary Smith who creates a
duplicate of herself using a replicating device, Parfit says,
I fall in love with Mary Smith. How should I react after she has first used the
Replicator? I claim both that I would and that I ought to love her Replica. This is
not the “ought” of morality. On the best conception of the best kind of love, I ought
to love this individual. She is fully psychologically continuous with the Mary Smith
I loved, and she has an exactly similar body. If I do not love Mary Smith’s Replica,
this could only be for one of several bad reasons.9
Here we have something close to (what we might crudely call) a descriptivist
conception of love rather than a conception of love as genuinely
historical—on Parfit’s account the actual history and identity of Mary Smith
are both deemed intrinsically unimportant.10 This is not to say that Parfit does
not recognize our natural tendency to prefer the original; he just thinks we are
ultimately irrational to place any significant weight on such a preference.11
8 Another noteworthy discussion of the relevance of duplicate swap cases to our understand-
ing of love is offered in Bernstein 1985. Writing in the first person, Bernstein considers what his
reaction would be upon learning that his wife Nancy was going to be replaced with a qualita-
tively indistinguishable individual Nancy*. He claims that he would “feel as if [he] were to suffer
a tremendous loss,” even though he acknowledges that should the switch occur he would be
unable to perceive any differences between Nancy and Nancy* (1985, 287). His own diagnosis
of this response leads him to conclude that “loving someone is, among other things, an
expression of our identity, of our uniqueness in the world around us” (291). While I think he
tends to overstate the degree to which our own self-conception hinges on love (and perhaps to
understate the degree to which love can be a direct response to the beloved), there is much in
his discussion with which I am sympathetic.
9 Parfit 1984, 295. Note that this passage comes in a discussion of the legitimacy of attaching
to “series-persons” rather than persons, and so Parfit’s goal at that point is the more limited goal
of defending such attachment. In the end, however, his position commits him to denying the
importance of the identity of a loved one in our world (and not just in a world where series-persons
are common) and, with this, the idea that resistance to replaceability is irrational. This is
because Parfit argues not just that identity does not matter but that what does matter are
psychological relations with any cause—and a duplicate possesses these psychological relations
(1984, 287).
10 Parfit is not alone here, of course: versions of a love-is-for-qualities approach stretch back
at least to Plato (cf. Grau 2006). On the similarities between Parfit’s and Plato’s accounts, see
Warner 1979. Later we will see that Persson 2005 takes a similar approach to the topic of
replaceability.
11 There has been a fascinating recent debate (kicked off by Machery et al. 2004) over the
possible cultural relativity of our intuitions regarding reference. (Machery et al. suggest that East
Asians are more inclined to descriptivist intuitions than to Kripkean ones.) To my knowledge no
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We will return to this worry about irrationality later, but next I want to
consider Rorty’s response to Kraut’s arguments about the importance of
history to love’s bond.
4. RORTY’S “HISTORICAL” ACCOUNT
Rorty offers a rather unsympathetic response to Kraut’s analogy. She begins
her essay by citing Yeats’s beautiful lady asking “Do you love me for myself
alone, or for my yellow hair?” and goes on to endorse Yeats’s reply: “Only
God, my dear, could love you for yourself alone, and not for your yellow hair”
(Rorty 1986, 399). While she acknowledges that we do seem to long to be loved
in a way that transcends our properties, she proposes that this longing is best
understood as a way of “expressing concern over [love’s] constancy or endur-
ance” rather than as a genuine worry over love’s “proper object” (399).
One of Rorty’s primary goals in her essay is to defend a particular con-
ception of love: what she calls “dynamically permeable” love. Such love
between two people allows for a dynamic interaction that in turn allows both
to grow and to change through the love. As she puts it:
It is permeable in that the lover is changed by loving and changed by truthful
perception of the friend. Permeability rejects being obtuse to change as an easy way
of assuring constancy. It is dynamic in that every change generates new changes,
both in the lover and in interactions with the friend. Having been transformed
by loving, the lover perceives the friend in a new way and loves in a new way.
(Rorty 1986, 402)
This kind of love ideally involves changes that help bring about the flour-
ishing of both partners (402). Also, the changes cannot accurately be
described as simply changes in interests due to the influence exerted by the
other. Rather, the changes are much more subtle and interactive, culmi-
nating in a transformation of each party through the capacity of the other
person (and the love relation between both persons) to open them up to
new ways of seeing the world (403). There is of course a danger that the
changes induced by such love could, in the end, help change the lovers in
such a way that their relationship cannot continue, but this does not show
that the love was weak or otherwise flawed. It is just one of the many risks
attached to giving oneself to another, and to strive for a less permeable or
one has yet done empirical research investigating the possibility of a similar relativity when it
comes to intuitions regarding replaceability and “rigid” attachment in love. It would, of course,
be extremely interesting if these intuitions also seemed to track cultural divides, especially if it
turns out that the people with (supposedly) descriptivist intuitions are also less resistant to
substitution scenarios (or less concerned with personal, numerical identity generally).
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more static relationship is, as we all know, more likely to extinguish the love
than to preserve it (404).
Rorty seems to think that this conception of an ideal loving relationship as
dynamic and permeable is somehow strongly at odds with Kraut’s notion of
love relationships being analogous to the rigid-designation of proper names.
She explicitly acknowledges Kraut’s (and Kripke’s) use of the term ‘rigid
designation’ in the first footnote to her paper, in which she reveals that the
piece was originally presented as a response to Kraut’s article.12 Rorty then
goes on to describe something related to Kraut’s notion when she discusses
“constant” love: acknowledging that love often involves a concern with con-
tinuity and constancy, she distinguishes her “interactive historical continuity”
account of love from a notion of love as requiring “enduring constancy”
(1986, 401).13 This latter notion is presumed to involve a love that “persists
despite changes in the friend’s traits, even changes in those traits that first
awoke the love and that were its central focus” (401). That description by itself
seems to fit both Nozick’s description and bears some similarity with Kraut’s
notion of love as involving a rigid (and historical) dimension. Rorty goes on to
add, however, that such love “remains at roughly the same level of devotion”
and claims that the superior, dynamically permeable love “is historical pre-
cisely because it does not (oh so wonderfully) rigidly designate its object.” Her
dynamic permeability account is also said to be preferable to “constant” love
because it “rejects being obtuse to change as an easy way of assuring con-
stancy” (402). There is the implication here that Kraut’s notion of “rigid”
historical love is motivated by nothing more than a fear of love coming to an
end, and there is also the suggestion that a Krautian lover is thus committed
to both accepting any change in the beloved and sto trying to keep a love
relationship at some set level of devotion.14 But the idea that a “rigid”
12 “In that paper Kraut examined an account of love as a de re, rather than a de dicto attitude;
he also analyzed it on the model of naming, as a rigidly designating relation” (Rorty 1986,
411–12 n. 1).
13 Things become rather confusing when Rorty appropriates the label ‘historical’ for her
account of love as dynamically permeable and contrasts that with what she calls a nonhistorical
rigid love. (And we will see that LaFollette 1996 will also use ‘historical’ in Rorty’s misleading
manner.)
14 This interpretation of Krautian rigidity actually carries over to a treatment of these topics
by LaFollette 1996. Here is a representative passage from his discussion: “The claim that Jane
wants to relate to Sarah as a unique individual is ambiguous. Jane may want to be with Sarah
simply because she (Sarah) is the object of her (Jane’s) care, not because Sarah is funny or kind
or intelligent or moral. If so, Jane’s attachment to Sarah is rigid: she wants to relate to the person
named ‘Sarah’, regardless of Sarah’s traits, no matter how Sarah changes. . . .Conversely, Jane’s
relationship with Sarah could be historical: Jane may relate to Sarah as identified by her
particular array of embodied traits. If so, Jane’s relationship is based on who Sarah is—right
now—as a historical creature” (LaFollette 1996, 5). It is unclear to what extent LaFollette is
familiar with Kraut’s piece—he lists it in his bibliography, but there are no citations
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relationship is one in which one is committed to loving a person “no matter
how” the person changes is not an idea we actually find in Kraut’s essay.
Perhaps Rorty thinks that, while Kraut never actually claims rigid love
ought to survive any and all possible changes in the beloved, he is nonetheless
committed to such an extreme view, given the analogy he draws with rigid
designation. If she is right about this, then there would be good reason to
reject Kraut’s approach: while most of us want to be loved in a way that can
survive certain changes in our character, it is not clear that we think such love
should survive any possible change, no matter how severe. If I went from
being a decent guy to a horribly immoral and unlikeable character, not only
would others understand if my partner stopped loving me (or came to love me
in a very different way), they might even respond with puzzlement if she did
not change her attitude toward me.15 A love that is overly rigid in this sense
could very well be a bad thing, and perhaps this kind of worry motivates
Rorty to say the following:
For the moment, let us suppose . . . Louis came to realize that he would continue to
love Ella even if she were to lose those traits that first drew him to her . . . he would
not transfer his love. This does not mean that he would see or love her de re, whatever
that might mean. Nor does it mean that the character of his devotion would remain
unchanged by whatever changes might occur in her. He’d be a lunatic to love her
at 60 in just exactly the same way as he had at 20. (1986, 403–04)
This sounds sensible enough. However, not only do I happen to think that
Kraut could agree with this idea that an appropriate love relationship might
fade or change if the persons involved change, he does agree:
The nontransferability, or historical nature, of love is a defining condition of its
being directed toward a unique individual. Thus construed, a nonhistorical love is
one that is directed toward general characteristics instantiated by a person rather
than a love directed toward the particular. This does not, however, entail that
genuinely “person-directed” love endure through all changes of characteristics.
Historicity may only require endurance through certain changes in certain relevant
respects. . . . Historicity does not entail permanence; analogously, proper names are
not eternally bound up with their referents. Every proper name can lose its use.
Every love has its limits.16
to it in the text. My hunch is that he is relying primarily on Rorty’s discussion, and so I think
what we have here is some evidence of a trail of damage done by Rorty’s misleading discussion
of Kraut.
15 At the same time, we might also understand if my partner retained a sense of real
commitment to me. That such a commitment can become entirely mysterious on accounts that
reduce love of persons to a love of characteristics (as well as accounts of personal identity that
reduce the identity of a person to a cluster of psychological states) is, to my mind, a serious
objection to such accounts.
16 Kraut 1986, 425. Admittedly, it is hard to know exactly what Kraut means here by
‘analogously’: proper names can of course “lose their use” if we no longer have a need to refer
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Now in fairness I think Kraut is stretching the analogy with proper names
here (and perhaps elsewhere), but even if he is going a bit overboard, it is still
nonetheless quite clear that he does not see his account of historical/rigid love
as being committed to accepting any and all changes in a person. It is quite
uncharitable of Rorty to ignore passages like this and to suggest instead that
he is offering a wildly implausible view about the nature of love’s bond.
Unfortunately, this misrepresentation of Kraut’s view as requiring both an
utter obtuseness to change and a bizarre demand for constant devotion is not
the only problem with Rorty’s discussion of Kraut’s essay. As she continues
on in her essay, she slides from discussing “constant” and “rigid” love as being
obtuse or blind to change to a rather different worry about a constant love that
involves resistance to change. She offers a series of remarks in which “rigid”
love is spoken of quite dismissively and is linked to “nonpermeable” love.
Here is one of several such remarks: “[They] might want constancy and think
of nonpermeable rigidity instead of historicity as the best way to achieve it.
(The pathological form of this attitude is an attempt to control and bind the
friend).”17 As we saw earlier, Rorty is surely aware that Kraut’s use of the
terms ‘rigid’ and ‘rigid designation’ are derived from the technical terminol-
ogy introduced by Kripke in Naming and Necessity (1980). However, ‘rigid’ as
she is using the term in the passage above (and related passages) seems to be
equated with nonpermeability, in the sense that both the lover and the
beloved ought not to change (either through the love or otherwise), and it is
clear that this is not what Kraut had in mind in his use of the term.18
It is rather ironic that Rorty ends up implying that Kraut’s position
involves a rigid attachment which is resistant to change in the beloved.
Indeed, someone who loves me “rigidly” in Kraut’s sense loves me as an
irreplaceable individual and thus our love can survive significant changes,
to the object in question, but one might object that there is still a sense in which the name refers,
even if it is no longer regularly used. Kraut might have in mind examples like Kripke’s “Santa
Claus,” where the referent for the term has, over time, probably switched from a certain
historical saint to a fictional entity (Kripke 1980, 93, 97). This case is also not particularly
analogous to the example of love fading, however. (For another discussion of ways in which the
analogy falls short, see Brown 1997, 55.)
17 Rorty 1986, 405; emphasis added. There are other similar passages at Rorty 1986, 404
and 405.
18 There are now at least three distinct senses of a “rigid love” in play, so it might be helpful
to explicitly distinguish them. (1) “Rigid” love as person-directed love rather than quality-directed.
(This is Kraut’s sense.) (2) “Rigid” love as blind love: an attachment to another in a way that
survives any changes in the properties of the beloved. (3) “Rigid” love as static love: a relationship
in which the lover desires that the beloved never change. (This is the notion Rorty uses later in
her essay when she speaks of an “impermeable” love.) Things are complicated by the fact that,
as we have just seen, Rorty’s essay displays an unacknowledged shift from the second sense of
rigid to the third, while LaFollette (see note 14) seems to stick to the second sense.
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whether those changes are brought about by the love itself or by something
else. Though this might sound odd, it is the un-“rigid” lover in Kraut’s
account who is more prone to crave a frozen or static love. While it is
possible that someone who loves me “rigidly” (in Kraut’s sense) might also
want me to stay as I am, one who instead loves me (in a non-Krautian
fashion) as a collection of characteristics has a rather straightforward reason
for desiring that our love remain static: dynamic interaction could bring
about a change in my properties and thus risks a possible diminishment of
the love. There is no reason why Kraut must deny that one of the positive
aspects of love is that it allows us to grow (and thus change) from each
other. Rorty’s emphasis on the advantages of dynamically permeable love is
fully justified, but it is puzzling just why she thinks this conception of love
is at odds with Kraut’s insights about the historical nature of love and the
rigid dimension that love often takes.
The distinction Kraut is after is not between a love that cannot accept
any change and one that is dynamically permeable, nor between a love that
will accept every change and one that is dynamically permeable but, rather,
between a love that is truly directed at a person and one that is instead
directed at properties or qualities possessed by that person. When Rorty
is arguing against other notions of rigidity (as either lack of openness to
accept change, or as a blindness to change), she is not arguing against
Kraut, nor do her arguments succeed in showing his analysis and compari-
son with proper names to be futile, despite her repeated comments to the
contrary.
5. CONSTANCY AND ATTACHMENT
What are we to make of this strange slide in the use of ‘rigid’ in Rorty’s essay?
Rorty’s main target seems to be an unhealthy demand for constancy in love
relationships. In battling this demand and in trying to promote the virtues of
her dynamic permeability account, Rorty seems to be confusing and conflat-
ing two different conceptions of what a constant love might involve: one is
Kraut’s (or at least derived fromKraut’s) and involves the idea that a love that
is true is constant in the sense of persisting in spite of (at least some) changes
in the beloved’s character. The other is a conception of love that remains
constant through a requirement that the beloved (and perhaps also the lover)
remain the same—the attachment is constant because the properties exhib-
ited by the beloved have remained constant. While it is obvious enough what
is wrong about the latter (frozen) form of love, it is much less obvious that the
former is misguided or in need of correction. To the extent that Rorty
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succeeds in casting doubt on the former Krautian conception, she does so by
tying it to a demand that such love remain at the same level of devotion and
in the implication that such love must also survive any and all changes in
characteristics, but as we have seen these are not aspects of Kraut’s concep-
tion of “rigid” love.
Rorty’s article does at times more directly address Kraut’s actual concerns
about the intentional focus of love, but it is unclear to what extent she rejects
his affirmation of irreplaceability as an indication of love for an individual.
While the title of her essay and her initial approving citation of Yeats certainly
imply that she rejects an account of love as ever (coherently) being for
something beyond properties, she does at other points seem to agree with the
idea that “we want to be loved ‘for ourselves alone’ rather than for our most
lovable traits” (Rorty 1986, 405). Still, as I mentioned earlier, she interprets
this desire as being at bottom simply an indirect way of expressing a desire
that the relationship continue.19 Though to some extent her apparent differ-
ences from Kraut can be attributed to her confusion between different senses
of ‘rigidity’, her claim that a desire to be loved “for oneself” is best understood
as simply a desire for constancy does seem to go directly against Kraut’s claims
that the intentional focus of our love should be the person. It is frustrating,
then, that she does not offer more in the way of an actual argument for this
claim that we are muddled in our desire to be loved “for ourselves alone” but
seems instead to take it as a given that such a desire is obviously reducible to
a desire for constancy.
While a desire to be loved for myself and a desire that the love endure
are often conjoined, it is not obvious why the former should be taken as
nothing more than a confused expression of the latter. I might well be perfectly
content with a relationship that I know cannot endure yet nonetheless insist
that the relationship involve an acknowledgment of me as an individual
person rather than as a collection of qualities. These two concerns are logi-
cally distinct and need not always go together. Imagine, for example, that
I have fallen in love even though I am terminally ill and have only a month
to live. My concerns over the brevity of the relationship might well be
entirely independent of any concerns I have regarding whether my lover
loves me or just (say) my remarkable prowess at croquet and my hypnoti-
cally blue eyes.
19 “Because the continuity of protective devotion is not automatically assured by the per-
manent individuating effects of interaction, we want to be loved ‘for ourselves alone’ rather than
for our most lovable traits, traits we realize we may lose” (Rorty 1986, 405). “This concern
about the proper object of the attitude is a way of expressing a concern about its constancy or
endurance” (399).
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6. LOVE’S OBJECT
I do not know what motivates Rorty to ignore the fact that concerns about
the focus of love seem to be conceptually distinct from worries about con-
stancy. Perhaps she feels the need to explain away a concern about the
object of love because she thinks such a concern is incoherent. However,
Rorty does want to acknowledge that love obviously involves some sort of
historical dimension. (She wants to be able to call her account the “histori-
cal” one, as we have seen.) While she is not explicit about this, presumably
she thinks that the intentional focus of love is best understood as a cluster
of properties that changes gradually over time, though at any given time
sharing enough of a “family resemblance” with the previous cluster to be
considered continuous. So long as changes are not too abrupt, she can then
agree with Kraut that love often survives some changes in the properties of
a person and, thus, has something of a historical dimension.20 (Though, again,
the sense in which it is “historical” is quite different from that discussed by
Kraut.) This is the sort of approach that Hugh LaFollette, inspired by
Rorty, ends up taking in his more extended discussion of these issues in
Personal Relationships.
[T]he relationships of special interest to this book will be those based, in important
respects, on the beloved’s traits. It is, of course, inappropriate to love someone
because of a single characteristic. We should not love someone simply because she
is intelligent or funny or kind. But that is inappropriate because love should not be
based on a small segment of the person, not because she is separable from her
characteristics. I cannot (voluntarily) love someone devoid of characteristics. Thus,
for voluntary relationships, we should have reasons for love, and those reasons must
be based on the beloved’s characteristics. (LaFollette 1996, 49)
I think there are a number of confusions in this passage. One of them involves
the apparent suggestion that someone who thinks love is directed at an
individual rather than at a cluster of properties must have an improper
metaphysic lurking in the background, one that requires positing a mysterious
bare locus or substrate that somehow exists beyond and behind the qualities
of a person. If this is LaFollette’s (or Rorty’s) basis for rejecting the possibility
that love can be directed at an individual and for concluding that love must
be directed at a collection of abstract qualities, it is misguided for reasons that
Kripke offered in Naming and Necessity.
20 This position, as I have described it, is ambiguous: it is compatible with thinking that we
attach to the cluster because that is all there is to being a person and is also compatible with the view
that a person might be something beyond that but all it makes sense to attach to are the
properties. Presumably Rorty holds the former position, but she might well be following Yeats
in holding the latter.
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What I do deny is that a particular is nothing but a “bundle of qualities,” whatever
that may mean. If a quality is an abstract object, a bundle of qualities is an object of
an even greater degree of abstraction, not a particular. Philosophers have come to
the opposite view through a false dilemma: they have asked, are these objects behind
the bundle of qualities, or is the object nothing but the bundle? Neither is the case; this
table is wooden, brown, in the room, etc. It has all these properties and is not a thing
without properties, behind them; but it should not therefore be identified with the
set, or “bundle,” of its properties, nor with the subset of its essential properties.
(1980, 52)
A particular person, like any particular object, is correctly understood as
something that possesses properties without “lurking behind” those properties
in a problematic manner. Elsewhere I say a bit more about this passage and
its relevance for sorting out metaphysical versus normative worries about love
(worries that often get unhelpfully conflated).21 My point here is not to deny
that there are metaphysical issues and controversies concerning the nature of
substances, individuals, and so forth. Rather, I am instead suggesting that
Kripke’s discussion can help remind us that there is not a special metaphysical
puzzle concerning persons as objects of love.22 We should not feel forced into
a metaphysical dichotomy such that love of qualities is all it makes sense to
acknowledge since the only alternative is taken to be an attachment to an
obviously unlovable bare locus.
7. BASIS/GROUND VERSUS OBJECT/FOCUS
As I said, it looks like LaFollette may be falling prey to a false dichotomy of
this sort in the passage I cited earlier. It may be that there is more going on,
however. (Or it may be that Rorty herself had different reasons for rejecting
Krautian love.) So I want to consider another reason that has been offered in
favor of the view that love must be directed at qualities. Often such an
assertion has been based on the observation that love certainly seems to get
going through an attraction to certain qualities of the beloved. If qualities are
what ground our love, aren’t qualities what we are in fact loving? We get this
sort of reasoning in Ingmar Persson’s recent treatment of these issues in The
Retreat of Reason.
For if love is to be love of a particular person, it must be caused by (awareness of) that
person. There must be something that attaches the love to this person rather than
anyone else, and it is hard to see what could provide this attachment if it is not
21 Grau 2006, 120–21. The remaining normative worry (i.e., how can it be reasonable to be so
partial in our attachment?) is one that I attempt to address in sec. 10.
22 A related and persuasive treatment of these issues with which I am in sympathy can be
found in Chappell 2003.
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causality. But when a thing causes something, it is always in virtue of having certain
features. Hence, when you love somebody, you love her in virtue of her having
certain features. In other words, it is the instantiation of those features that you love.
(2005, 330)
Persson goes on to describe his view as one in which “love of a particular is
reducible to love of some properties it exemplifies,” and he concludes that the
beloved is thus replaceable.23 While I can certainly feel the force of this sort
of move, I think it is mistaken, for reasons that have been repeatedly pointed
out by others who have written on this topic. David Velleman, citing earlier
work by Alan Soble, points out that there is confusion in this sort of reasoning
between “the basis and object of love.”24 Niko Kolodny, also citing Soble,
speaks of confusion between the “ground” and the “focus” of love.25 While
my own approach differs from Soble’s, Kolodny’s, and Velleman’s in various
respects, I share their judgment that we do best to avoid such confusion. The
qualities of the person that draw me to them, that is, the ground or basis of my
love, need not be identical to the actual object of the love. I love the person, not
simply some of the qualities the person manifests. I think Kraut’s analogy with
Kripke’s approach to reference can be helpful here: it should not surprise us
that love might begin with and involve an attraction to qualities yet come to
be directed at the person rather than simply the qualities, for consider that we
similarly do not tend to find it surprising that the reference of (say) the word
‘water’ may have initially been determined in virtue of various surface char-
acteristics but has come to be directed at water itself (i.e., H2O).
8. OTHER DOUBTS
Granting all that I have argued so far, skepticism may linger. If love begins
with an attraction to qualities but can transcend that to involve a bond to the
beloved, why does love ever fade? If the analogy with proper names is
23 Persson 2005, 330. Persson’s endorsement of replaceability flows, like Parfit’s, from con-
siderations about the unimportance of identity and the apparent irrationality of nonderivative
self-concern.
24 Velleman 1999, 368. In his wide-ranging and impressive paper, David Velleman offers
his own robustly Kantian interpretation of the nature of love. While I agree with many of his
specific insights, I reject his general approach for reasons similar to those described in Millgram
2004 and Callcut 2005.
25 Kolodny 2003, 154. My comments later may make it sound like I am adopting what
Kolodny has called a “no-reasons” view on love. While I have doubts that the emphasis he
places on “valuing a relationship” can do all the justificatory heavy-lifting he expects of it, I think
much of the analysis in this paper is compatible with (and can indeed supplement) Kolodny’s
account of love as valuing a relationship. Given the richness of Kolodny’s essay, however,
making the case for this would take more space than I have available here.
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supposed to help us, then why is not the bond of love as rigid as the bond of
reference? We saw earlier that Kraut does not deny that love can fade, but he
also does not offer an explanation for why or how this occurs. It might be felt
that such an explanation is needed. After all, on a love-is-for-qualities account
we appear to have a very straightforward explanation for the loss of love: the
fading can be said to occur as a result of changes in the qualities manifested
by the beloved. Certainly it seems that the loss of love often tracks qualitative
changes. (“You’re not the man I married!” is a remark usually uttered in the
context of a divorce.) Doesn’t this show us that the idea of love transcending
qualities is, at best, a naïve illusion?
The situation is not as tidy as this line of thought suggests, however, for
love’s bond does not seem to consistently and proportionally track alterations in
qualities in the manner one would expect if all it is to love someone is to love
their qualities. It is not uncommon for love to survive significant alterations
and to even survive alterations for the worse.26 Now, as Persson points out in
his discussion of this issue, the love-is-for-qualities proponent can accommo-
date such alterations—they can simply assert that the love has transferred to
new qualities (2005, 330). However, given just that diagnosis, the reasons (if
any) for such a transference are entirely opaque, while on a love-is-for-
individuals approach there is a straightforward and sensible explanation for
why the love endures: such love involves a commitment to an individual (not
just the qualities an individual manifests) and the individual in question has
endured the change in qualities. Beyond this issue, we have already seen that
a love-is-for-qualities approach is in direct conflict with widespread and quite
strong intuitions regarding the irreplaceability of the beloved (as brought out
in duplicate swap examples). So the denial that love is directed at individual
persons brings with it its own distinct and quite significant challenges when it
comes to explaining key aspects of the experience of love.
It might look at this point as if the situation is something of a draw: both
approaches, it seems, face real difficulties doing justice to the phenomenology.
On reflection, however, I think it is clear that an approach in which love is
seen as directed at persons (and not just qualities) is preferable. Though it can
be easy to forget the complexities here and to resort to a mode of thinking in
which love is seen to be either for qualities or for a featureless locus, it is
important to remember that the view being argued for is one in which love is
for persons and persons possess qualities. Given that persons have qualities, it
26 Thus the plausibility and appeal of the famous line from Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116 that
Rorty mocks in her title: “Love is not love/ Which alters when it alteration finds.” Of course,
it is also not uncommon for love to fade despite no significant change in qualities, an occurrence
explored in Hank Williams, Jr.’s classic musical lament: “Why don’t you love me like you used
to do? . . . My hair’s still curly and my eyes are still blue” (from “Why Don’t You Love Me?”).
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is far from surprising that love’s bond involves some connection to the qualities
of the beloved. One thing that is going on in loving another person is an
appreciation of that person’s qualities. (In some cases that may be the main
thing going on, and, in such cases, a loss of love may closely correspond with
a change for the worse in qualities.) Usually an attraction to qualities is not all
that is going on, however. Further complicating matters, qualities can be
appreciated in a variety of ways in love relationships. They can be appreci-
ated because they are deemed antecedently valuable, but they can also come
to be valued because they are the qualities possessed by the beloved. Thus, we
have the not unfamiliar phenomenon of someone coming to admire an aspect
of a loved one that, prior to the love relationship, held little appeal (either in
the beloved or more generally).27
Given that love’s bond involves not just an attraction to qualities, it should
not be surprising that when the bond alters, such alteration does not neces-
sarily track a change in qualities. This is because the beloved is more than just
a cluster of qualities but is, rather, a person who has both qualities and a
specific history. Properly understanding love’s bond requires attention to that
history.
9. LOVE AND HISTORY
Rorty and LaFollette both repeatedly insist that their accounts acknowledge
the importance of history to love. LaFollette even goes so far as to claim early
on in his book that “any attempt to completely identify someone with her
traits masks the historical dimensions of ‘who she is’ ” (1996, 7). Since I have
accused both of neglecting a crucial element of the historicity of love, further
clarification is in order. It is instructive to consider an example offered by
LaFollette in which one is faced with a “double” of a friend. He sensibly insists
that a personal relationship with one woman cannot simply be transferred to
a similar “double.”
Thus, although Sarah and Ruth [Sarah’s “double”] have the “same” traits, Jane’s
and Sarah’s reservoir of experiences and their established patterns of relating dif-
ferentiate Sarah and Ruth. Sarah is unique: she has experiences Ruth does not have;
she has a relationship with Jane that Ruth does not have. . . . Consequently, Jane
would not drop Sarah as a friend simply because she met Ruth, who has similar
traits. At least she would not do so if they had a genuinely personal relationship.
(LaFollette 1996, 8)
27 Alain de Botton offers a charming example of this phenomenon in his first novel On Love
(1993). There he describes the process of coming to be smitten by the gap between his lover’s
two front teeth.
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What are we to make of this? LaFollette, following Rorty, repeatedly criticizes
“rigid” relationships in his discussion of love and friendship, but is not the
resistance to substitution described in this passage just what Kraut was after
in characterizing love as “rigid” and the beloved as “irreplaceable”? While it
is tempting to think that LaFollette is in fact expressing a Krautian point here,
differences between the case LaFollette describes and the kind of duplicate
swap case we considered earlier turn out to be crucial. LaFollette’s replace-
ment example involves a double that is not exactly identical: while she may
have “similar traits,” her different life experiences have left her with different
memories and presumably different behavioral dispositions. LaFollette and
Rorty often talk of the importance of history, but they mean something very
different than Kraut does. In fact, their conception of the role history should
play in relationships is one that even Parfit acknowledges. Consider Parfit’s
comments on the differences between a duplicate swap and a case closer to
the kind LaFollette describes.
Ordinary love could not be so transferred. Such love is concerned with the psychol-
ogy of the person loved, and with the person’s continually changing mental life. And
loving someone is a process, not a fixed state. Mutual love involves a shared history.
This is why, if I have loved Mary Smith for many months or years, her place cannot
simply be taken by her identical twin. Things are quite different with her Replica. If
I have loved Mary Smith for months or years, her Replica will have full quasi-
memories of our shared history. (Parfit 1984, 295)
A twin might share many characteristics with Mary Smith, but she will not
have the same history; accordingly, there will be important differences in the
psychological states of the two women. Similarly, LaFollette’s “double” does
not share a history; so there is a straightforward explanation as to why love
should not transfer. Note, however, that the “reservoir of experiences” and
“established patterns of relating” that differentiate Sarah and Ruth in LaFol-
lette’s example would not differentiate Sarah from her Replica (call her
“Sarah*”). Sarah* would have perfect copies of the memories of Sarah and,
thus, would be able to relate and reminisce in exactly the same way. Since
LaFollette never considers the case in which an exact qualitative duplicate is
substituted, it is hard to know what he would say, but I suspect that he would
follow Parfit in thinking that one ought to love a duplicate as one loved the
original person. Further support for this reading comes from the fact that later
in his book LaFollette seems to justify his concern with history on strictly
prudential grounds.
Understanding practical reason in this way highlights the importance of one specific
reason we sometimes have for loving another (a reason discussed in the first chapter),
namely, that we have a history of relating with them. . . . If we have a successful
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relationship it is generally imprudent to abandon it to pursue a relationship with
another, even another with traits similar to our current partner. . . . Reason cannot
predict that we can relate satisfactorily to any potential friend. The only way to know
we can relate successfully is to successfully relate. (1996, 63)
Reason can predict that we will successfully relate with a duplicate, however, or
at least it can predict as accurately in that case as it can with regard to the
original person. In the end, then, LaFollette’s concern with history and
resistance to the swapping of a friend with a “double” does not seem to
commit him to accepting the kind of irreplaceability or historicity that Kraut
highlighted and that I have attempted to defend.
Distinguishing between LaFollette’s “double” case and Kraut’s “dupli-
cate” (or Parfit’s “Replica”) case allows us to better understand the different
notions of historicity at play in the views of Kraut, Parfit, and LaFollette.
Kraut is quite explicit in explaining historicity in terms of resistance to
replacement, a resistance that I have suggested can hold even when the
replacement in question is a duplicate that shares all the quasi-“historical”
properties of the original, that is, a duplicate that has qualitatively identical
quasi-memories. On this approach, a love that can be transferred to a dupli-
cate is not a historical love because it fails to recognize the importance of the
actual history of the person loved. The duplicate has a kind of simulated
history (in having the same features that the original has acquired in the
course of his/her history), but this is not enough to warrant loving the
duplicate as if it were the original person.28
In contrast, Rorty’s and LaFollette’s justifications for a concern for history
appear, like Parfit’s, to be entirely future directed or forward looking: history
matters because of what it allows now and in the future—the past relationship
has created a network of shared activities and memories that matter because
they come into play when I now (or in the future) relate to the beloved. This
approach grants the past a type of instrumental value, one which derives
solely from the importance of its future predictive benefits.29 The Krautian
approach that I have defended, however, acknowledges that in addition to
obvious forward-looking aspects, many love relationships contain a genuinely
28 This is not to say, implausibly, that one would not be attracted or likely to fall in love with
such a duplicate. It is to say instead that a simple transference of the bond of love (one that
ignores the distinction between the original and the duplicate) can rightly be regarded as
problematic. (I discuss this issue at greater length in my “Love, Loss, and Identity in Solaris,”
forthcoming.)
29 This approach bears an interesting similarity to those philosophical approaches to pun-
ishment that seek to revise away backward-looking retributive aspects based on worries that
only forward-looking consequentialist defenses are sufficiently rational. (It is not coincidental
that proponents of replaceability like Parfit and Persson also express skepticism regarding the
rational foundations for desert.)
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backward-looking element. This is because love often involves, not just
an attraction to a cluster of qualities that might be valuable in the future,
but a commitment to a concrete individual who has a particular origin and a
particular past—in other words, a commitment to an individual with a
particular identity.30
10. THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY
Philosophical discussions of the nature of love do not often interact with the
traditional personal identity debate. This is unfortunate, since a conception of
love for persons is unlikely to float free of a conception of the nature of
persons. It is to Parfit’s credit that he highlights this connection in his ground-
breaking work on personal identity. We have already seen that his metaphysi-
cal speculations lead him to embrace a highly revisionary conception of
persons and so personal relationships, for his denial that personal (numerical)
identity can rationally matter results in his promoting the legitimacy of love
transferring to an exact duplicate.31 Of course, this move comes at a signifi-
cant cost: Parfit’s denial that the identity of others can matter is tied to a
radically revisionary understanding of self-concern (i.e., of your own identity).
It is not just the beloved who fades away under Parfitian reductionism—you
are also not what you might have thought.
Some are willing to bite the Parfitian bullet and accept that their attach-
ment to both themselves and to others cannot have a legitimate basis deriving
from the value we ordinarily place on personal identity. My own view is that,
despite the justificatory puzzles and dilemmas Parfit’s work has brought to
light, we need not revise away either a basic concern for the identities of
others or our own nonderivative tendencies toward self-concern. I find con-
vincing a broadlyWittgensteinian approach that emphasizes the fundamental
and “bedrock” nature of such concerns and, thus, discounts attempts at
justification here as neither necessary nor desirable. In an underappreciated
article entitled “The Value of Individuals,” Kenneth Henley summarizes this
approach: “I will argue that the valuing of individuals as individuals is non-
rational, but that it is not irrational. The view that valuing individuals as
individuals is irrational rests on the inappropriate application of criteria of
rationality to one of those natural, unreasoned human tendencies which
30 My thoughts on the importance of the past owe much to David Cockburn (1990, esp.
153–58).
31 Note that the most powerful argument offered by Parfit for “the unimportance of
identity”—his fission example—has less clear relevance to our concerns about history than, say,
his teletransporter/replica example, for the fission case is one in which both resulting persons
share the very same (numerically identical) prior history and origin.
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underlie our various practices of reason-giving.”32 Henley’s discussion does
not mention Parfit, and his focus in that article is our attachment to others as
individuals. But he points out that similar reasoning applies to worries about
the rationality of our self-concern.
Is it irrational to value oneself as an individual—to regard oneself as irreplaceable?
There could be no reason for this valuing of an individual as an individual—
though there are statements we are tempted to use as if they stated reasons. Con-
sider the question “Why does it matter to you that you continue to exist and that
you flourish, rather than just that someone (like you) exist[s] and flourish[es]?”
Perhaps someone might answer, “Because I am I.” But this says nothing at
all. Concern for self is unreasoned, though there can, of course, be reasoning based
on this unreasoned concern. But surely it does not follow that concern for self is
irrational.33
Mark Johnston comes to a similar sort of defense from the other direction. In
an essay in which his primary focus is defending nonderivative self-concern
against Parfit’s attacks, he helpfully and explicitly extends his scope beyond
self-concern to self-referential concerns and to “loyalism” more generally
and, thus, to loyalty toward a particular loved one.
Indeed, in order to get into the frame of mind in which limited self-concern
and loyalism need justifying at all, one has to take the view that to justify a concern
is to show how having it would make the world go better. But we may well ask,
what justifies the concern that the world go better? Nothing does, or at least
nothing else does—the concern that the world go better, like self-referential
concern, is a basic pattern of concern. This is not to say that these basic patterns
of concern cannot be defended against the claim that they are unreasonable. In
barest outline the defense of self-referential concern would be that we find it utterly
natural and that, at least so far, critical and informed reflection has not made it out
to be unreasonable.34
32 Henley 1977, 349. Though Henley does not cite Strawson (or Wittgenstein), this is the
sort of philosophical move that is perhaps most well known through the writings of Peter
Strawson on free will, particularly his landmark essay “Freedom and Resentment” (1968).
Strawson elsewhere (1985) credits the later writings of Wittgenstein as his inspiration for this
approach, and in particular Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty (1969).
33 Henley 1977, 349. Similar parallels (between self-concern and attaching to the beloved as
irreplaceable) are also drawn by Frankfurt (1999, 169) and Bernstein (1985, 219). Neither of
these authors (nor Henley) goes on to connect these considerations to relevant discussions of
self-concern in the literature on personal identity.
34 Johnston 1992, 599. Johnston goes on to discuss a duplicate swap case involving a loved
one (607–08). He also helpfully points out that the appeals to “naturalness” here are not
problematic evolutionary appeals but, rather, involve a broadly coherentist picture of justifica-
tion, one for which “concerns that are natural and fundamental have a certain kind of defeasible
presumption in favor of their reasonableness; they can not [sic] all be thrown into doubt at once”
(599). See also Wiggins (1987, 307): “These are things we need reasons to opt out of rather than
things we have to look for deep reasons to opt into.”
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Extending these insights from Johnston and Henley, I think it is reasonable to
dig in one’s heels and insist that the historicity and irreplaceability of the
beloved can be defended as, in an important sense, ungrounded and natural.
Such attitudes are best construed as neither rational nor irrational, but as a
fundamental, nonrational (or arational) feature of our lives that need not be
revised away out of fear of irrationality.35 The felt need to provide a justifi-
cation here occurs only when one has forgotten just how basic this kind of
concern is and how any justification provided will appeal to concerns that are
equally basic.36
To describe our commitment to valuing the beloved as a historical indi-
vidual as being in some sense “beyond justification” is not to claim that this
commitment is wholly inexplicable or inscrutable. It is no accident that we
attach to individuals as we do, and certain features of those individuals help
explain much of the force of our attachments. In general, the fact that persons
are subjects of experience seems relevant to our tendency to value them as
historical and irreplaceable.37 Also relevant is the additional capacity for
responsible agency that most persons possess.38 (Note that this is the same
feature that causes justice to also be fundamentally backward-looking—recall
Nozick’s linkage of justice to love in the passage cited earlier.) Finally, the fact
that love often involves reciprocity and a shared history is surely relevant to a
full understanding of love being “rigidly” individual-directed.39 My point here
35 For a similar but slightly stronger argument that such attitudes are rational, see Unger
(1990, 254): “Provided that we have stable attitudes to this effect, and no comparably strong
attitudes in conflict, we might be entirely rational in maintaining these limits. As with reasons for
anything, our own reasons in these present matters must come to an end somewhere or else, of
course, be within some circle of justification, however large or small” (emphasis added).
36 See also Williams (1985, 114): “A practice may be so directly related to our experience
that the reason it provides will simply count as stronger than any reason that might be advanced
for it.”
37 The relevance to this topic of our capacity for consciousness and subjectivity was pointed
out by Henley (1977) but has been given a more thorough and sophisticated recent treatment
by Jollimore (forthcoming). In Grau 2002 I argue (pace Henley) that our tendency toward
valuing some nonsubjects (such as some works of nature and artifacts) as historical and irre-
placeable complicates efforts to completely explain historicity in virtue of subjectivity. That the
beloved’s subjectivity is relevant for understanding the depth and nature of our attachment in
love relationships is not something I would deny.
38 The relevance of responsible agency for our thoughts on irreplaceability and love is
helpfully explored in Gowans 1996. Gowans suggests that facts about agency are themselves
sufficient to provide a justification of our attitudes regarding irreplaceability. This aspect of his
(otherwise illuminating) discussion strikes me as problematic, both for its inability to explain the
irreplaceability of some objects (see n. 39) and for the difficulty such an approach faces in
making sense of bonds of love that cannot plausibly hinge on the agency of the beloved, such as
a mother’s love for her newborn child.
39 Brown emphasizes the role of reciprocity in her discussion. However, she reasonably
concludes that a consideration of reciprocity by itself cannot amount to a complete account of
individual-directed love. See, in particular, her consideration of a beloved who is in a perma-
nent coma (1997, 62–63).
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is not to deny that such features play a role in making sense of our attitudes
regarding identity, history, and love; it is rather to explain how we are entitled
to our attitudes even though a complete justification of them may not be
available through reference to any of these features. In other words, there are
indeed “reasons for love,” in the sense that there are reasons that help explain
the general practice of “rigid” attachment in love (e.g., both the beloved’s
capacities as a subject of experiences and as a responsible agent help make
sense of such attachment), but these reasons have limits—they may show the
depth of the practice, and how it coheres with our other practices and values,
but they do not provide the sort of ultimate justification craved by some. My
larger point, however, is to challenge the legitimacy of this craving. Attitudes
as fundamental as these do not require such a ground. In fact, as Johnston
points out, they provide the ground for many of our justifications: “On the face
of it such limited self-referential concern is among the easiest of things to
justify. Much is justified only in terms of such concern.”40 Justifications must
indeed come to an end, but where they end is also where, in a different sense,
they begin: our tendency to attach to others as irreplaceable, historical indi-
viduals is best construed as a source of reasons rather than as standing in need of
reasons for its defense.
What about reasons justifying a particular attachment to a particular
individual (as opposed to reasons that justify the general practice)? If we are
asked to justify an attachment, we can usually offer explanations that reference
attractive qualities, shared experiences, acts of responsible agency, and so
on—reasons that explain, in part, our commitment to that person. However,
such explanations are bound to be incomplete, for in the case of loving a
particular individual, the very nature of the bond is such that it ultimately defies
the kind of abstraction required for reason-giving.41 To abstract out features
that explain why we love an individual is to undermine the very uniqueness of
that individual, the love for whom we are trying to defend. As Henley (1977,
345) nicely puts it: “To value an individual as an individual, the valuer must
rule out the possibility of giving reasons for the valuing which are sufficient to
pick out what is valued from all other things. Since reasons must always have
at least possible application outside of the particular case, there can be no
reason for valuing an individual as an individual.” And Montaigne, as usual,
was onto something when he famously exclaimed: “If you press me to say why
I loved him, I can say no more than it was because he was he, and I was I”
40 Johnston 1992, 599. Cf. Lewis (1960, 71): “Friendship is unnecessary, like philosophy, like
art. . . . It has no survival value; rather it is one of those things that give value to survival.”
41 This is not to say that there is not a limited sense in which such love is universalizable. As
Lamb (1997, 39–40) has pointed out, this sort of attachment can be universalizable across
possible worlds even though it is not universalizable within an actual world.
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(Par ce que c’estoit luy; par ce que c’estoit moy) (1992, 188). At the end of the day, that
may be all there is to say on the matter, but if the preceding reflections are
correct, that is all that need be said.
This brief discussion of the legitimacy of valuing loved ones as individuals
and of the importance of identity is not intended to amount to a comprehen-
sive defense against skeptics like Parfit and Persson, but I hope that it has at
least made clear one plausible direction of response—a direction that offers
powerful resources for understanding and accepting our deep-seated inclina-
tion toward a direct regard for the identities of those we love.42
11. CONCLUSION
I have not tried to provide a complete theory of love in this essay. I have
doubts whether such a theory is even possible, though I do not begrudge the
efforts of those more optimistic than myself on this front. My goal here has
been more limited: I have defended and extended some of Robert Kraut’s
neglected insights into the historicity of love, and I have suggested ways we
can make further progress through explicitly connecting concerns about
love’s historicity with questions of personal identity and rationality. I began
by arguing that a proper appreciation of the way in which history matters in
love ought to involve the recognition that we love particular historical indi-
viduals, not just clusters of qualities that those individuals happen to manifest.
Our attachments to such individuals contain an important backward-looking
component, a component that makes those individuals irreplaceable to us.
This aspect of the historicity of love is ignored or suppressed by approaches
like Rorty’s and LaFollette’s, approaches that attempt to simplify the com-
plexities of love by presenting strictly forward-looking accounts (that they
nonetheless dub “historical”). The motives for such simplification remain
unclear, but presumably the temptation to revise away the backward-looking
elements in love comes from worries about the rationality of those elements.
42 This approach to defending the importance of identity is compatible with a range of views
regarding the correct criteria for personal identity. While I cannot argue for this conclusion here,
I take some theories of personal identity to be significantly more successful than others at
cohering with our intuitions regarding historicity and irreplaceability. In particular, I think the
best fit with the vision of love defended here is offered by a cluster of approaches that (roughly)
take the continuance of a functioning brain as necessary for identity. (In Parfitian terminology,
these views approximate what he calls a “narrow psychological criterion,” which insists on
normal causation [1984, 207]). Sophisticated versions of the approach can be found in Johnston
1987, Unger 1990, and McMahan 2003. It is worth noting, given the role Kripke’s work has
played in my discussion, that one of the earlier defenses of this sort of approach is Nagel’s
treatment in The View from Nowhere, where Nagel explicitly (and quite helpfully) connects a “brain
as essential” view with Kripkean insights concerning natural kinds, rigid designation, and
essentialism. See in particular Nagel 1986, 39–43.
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I have argued that such worries, which are significantly connected to worries
about the importance of identity and the legitimacy of self-concern, are
ultimately misguided. Our tendency to attach to others as irreplaceable,
historical individuals is appropriate and defensible, and once we appreciate
this, we are better placed to understand at least one important aspect of the
very complicated and perplexing phenomenon we call love.43
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